

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 10-1784

ROBERT T. MILLER,

Appellant

v.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.;
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Pilot Retirement
Benefit Program Fixed Income Plan (A Plan);
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Pension Benefits Administration Committee

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-08-cv-00277)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo

Argued November 16, 2010
Before: AMBRO, FISHER and WEIS, *Circuit Judges*.

(Filed: 1/25/2011)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, *Circuit Judge*.

Robert T. Miller filed suit against American Airlines, Inc., the American Airlines, Inc. Pilot Retirement Benefit

Program Fixed Income Plan, and the American Airlines, Inc. Pension Benefits Administration Committee (collectively, "American"), alleging a violation of § 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Miller asserted that American impermissibly terminated his long-term disability benefits, and informed him of this action in a vague and misleading letter. He further alleged that American's review of his case failed to consider all of his relevant diagnoses, as well as the unique requirements of his employment as a pilot. The District Court granted American's Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling that American's termination decision was proper. This appeal requires us to consider whether the administrative process that American employed complied with the procedural mandates of ERISA and, if not, whether the proper remedy is a remand to the plan administrator or a reinstatement of benefits. For the reasons stated herein, we will reverse the decision of the District Court. We hold that the termination of Miller's benefits was arbitrary and capricious in light of the numerous substantive deficiencies and procedural irregularities that pervaded American's decision-making process. We further hold that Miller is entitled to retroactive reinstatement of his disability benefits.

I.

A. Factual History

Miller was employed as a commercial airline pilot for American Airlines for nearly ten years. In August 1998,

Miller suffered a psychotic episode while on duty and was subsequently admitted to the hospital. He was prescribed various medications as part of his treatment regimen. Miller's FAA medical certification, required for all commercial pilots, was revoked.

Miller applied for long-term disability ("LTD") benefits under the American Airlines, Inc. Pilot Retirement Benefit Program Fixed Income Plan (the "Plan"), a defined benefit plan subject to ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 *et seq.* Miller began receiving treatment from a psychiatrist, Dr. Abel Gonzalez, in September 1998. Dr. Gonzalez diagnosed Miller as suffering from anxiety disorder and brief reactive psychosis. On February 3, 1999, Dr. Gonzalez reported to American that Miller had suffered brief reactive psychosis caused by physical fatigue, sleep deprivation, and emotional stress, and that his progress was "favorable." Thereafter, American awarded Miller LTD benefits in November 1999.

The Plan provides "own occupation" disability benefits, where a pilot deemed disabled from employment as a pilot for American may receive benefits even if he could work in a different capacity. Under the Plan, "[d]isability means an illness or injury verified through a qualified medical authority . . . which prevents a Member from continuing to act as an Active Pilot Employee in the Service of the Employer." (App. at 717.) In addition, an employee will no longer be eligible for LTD benefits if, among other things, "verification of such Disability can no longer be established." (*Id.* at 739.) The Plan vests discretionary authority with a

Pension Benefits Administration Committee (“PBAC”) that has the power to determine benefits eligibility. Charlotte Teklitz was the delegate of the PBAC who reviewed appeals from the denial or termination of benefits.

In May 2003, American informed Miller that it could no longer substantiate his disability and terminated his benefits as a result. Dr. Gonzalez subsequently submitted documentation reiterating that Miller had been diagnosed with anxiety and brief reactive psychosis. Dr. Gonzalez noted that Miller had taken medication until January 2000 and that he had been “asymptomatic” since the spring of 2001. (*Id.* at 112.) He further noted that Miller would be able to return to work once his FAA medicate certification was reinstated. In June 2003, Dr. Gonzalez provided four progress notes at American’s request. His notes stated that Miller remained asymptomatic, that he was not taking any medication, and that pursuant to FAA regulations he was still not able to work. After receiving this information, American determined that Miller “[m]edically qualifies for [the] disability pension program” and reinstated his LTD benefits. (*Id.* at 148.)

Over the next two years, American periodically requested medical updates from Miller to document his disability. In response, Dr. Gonzalez provided documentation that Miller was still under his care, that he was seen monthly, and that he was not taking any medication. American subsequently noted that Miller was not expected to return to work. In August 2005, Miller provided another letter from Dr. Gonzalez reporting that Miller was asymptomatic, that he

required adequate sleep to prevent manifestations of stress, and that he was not taking any medication. On October 16, 2006, Dr. Gonzalez provided four additional progress notes stating that Miller's diagnosis was the same, that he was doing well, that he was "in general asymptomatic with good mental stability," and that he was not taking any medication. (*Id.* at 107.)

On October 23, 2006, American sent Miller a letter notifying him that his LTD benefits were terminated. The letter provided:

We are in receipt of your recent correspondence from Dr. Abel Gonzalez, submitted in response to our letter of September 21, 2006 from Jeanne Spoon, RN. However, we are unable to verify either the existence of a continuing medical disability or your continued substantial progress towards obtaining your FAA medical certification.

(*Id.* at 98.) The letter then quoted the Plan and stated that a pilot's disability will cease if "verification of such Disability can no longer be established." (*Id.*) The letter further elaborated:

In order to receive further favorable consideration, you will need to demonstrate that you are actively pursuing obtaining your FAA medical certification.

At this time, however, verification of your continued disability cannot be established and your disability benefits under the Plan will end immediately[.]

(*Id.*) Significantly, the Plan does not make eligibility for LTD benefits contingent on a pilot's pursuing medical certification with the FAA. Upon receiving this letter, Miller contacted American and inquired as to why his benefits were terminated. In response, American referred him to the termination letter and did not provide any additional information. Miller appealed the decision to the PBAC on November 30, 2006. To support his claim, Miller included a completed appeal form stating that he continued to have active psychiatric diagnoses and submitted a letter from Dr. Gonzalez.

In this letter, Dr. Gonzalez stated that Miller "has been continually and [] permanently disabled from obtaining a Class One Medical Certificate as required by F.A.A. regulations since August of 1998." (*Id.* at 340.) Dr. Gonzalez further clarified that Miller "remains permanently disabled due to medical reasons." (*Id.*) According to Dr. Gonzalez, Miller continued to suffer from anxiety and psychosis, as he had since his original diagnosis. Dr. Gonzalez then went on to summarize Miller's treatment:

The necessity for this continued [sic] treatment has and will continue to exist because of the nature of his psychiatric conditions.

More specifically, his diagnosis reveals and refers to latent vulnerability on his mental status so that prevention [sic] medical treatment, when adequate, may be sufficient. However, no medical treatment has the capacity to neither revert, undo, nor cure such condition.

(*Id.*) Dr. Gonzalez concluded by noting that Miller continued on active treatment necessary to preserve his health and that his prognosis was fair.

In light of the disagreement as to Miller's eligibility for LTD benefits, American referred the case to Western Medical Evaluators ("WME") for an outside medical review on March 27, 2007.¹ American directed WME to perform an "evidence-based, forensic medical review/evaluation" of Miller's case. (*Id.* at 300.) The letter from American stated that Miller's "[c]onditions [c]laimed" were anxiety disorder and brief reactive psychosis. (*Id.*) Additionally, American prompted WME to answer six specific questions regarding the evidentiary support for the "continuing presence of [Miller's] psychiatric diagnoses." (*Id.* at 301.)

¹ The Plan dictates that disputes will be referred to a clinical authority and that those findings "regarding the nature and extent of such illness or injury shall be final and binding upon the Administrator, the Association and the Member and his Beneficiaries." (App. at 785-86.)

In response, Drs. Seskind and Crain of WME reviewed Miller's file and provided American with a report on April 20, 2007. Neither performed a physical evaluation of Miller or communicated with him. Dr. Crain's report reviewed the documents in Miller's file and found that the records "did not document any psychiatric problems or explain [Miller's] failure to obtain the required medical certificate." (*Id.* at 310.) As such, Dr. Crain determined that Miller was not disabled. Dr. Seskind's portion of the report noted that FAA standards require that a pilot not suffer from psychosis. He then went on to say it was "crucial to note" that Miller was not undergoing psychotherapy, that he was not taking medication, and that he had not attempted to obtain his FAA medical certification. (*Id.* at 312.) In light of the fact that Miller had not requested a formal approval of his psychiatric designation from an FAA medical examiner and been denied this certification, Dr. Seskind found that Miller "is therefore not really disabled." (*Id.*) On May 22, 2007, American sent Miller a letter which included the WME report and reaffirmed the termination decision.

B. Procedural History

On February 13, 2008, Miller filed a complaint against American in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania alleging a claim for benefits pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On November 30, 2009, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation proposing that that District Court grant Miller's motion for

summary judgment and order the retroactive reinstatement of his benefits. *Miller v. American Airlines, Inc.*, No. 08-CV-277, 2009 WL 6039583, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2009). According to the report, American's termination of Miller's LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious due to numerous procedural errors on the part of American. *See id.*

On March 8, 2010, the District Court rejected the Magistrate's report and granted summary judgment in favor of American. *Miller v. American Airlines, Inc.*, No. 08-CV-277, 2010 WL 890016, at *11 (M.D. Pa. March 8, 2010). The District Court determined that American's termination decision was not arbitrary and capricious. *See id.* In its ruling, the District Court concluded that American had received new information from Dr. Gonzalez that Miller was "asymptomatic," and therefore properly concluded that he was no longer disabled. *See id.* at *8. Additionally, the District Court concluded that the termination letter sufficiently described the reasons for discontinuing Miller's LTD benefits. *See id.* at *9. Likewise, the District Court determined that American did not impermissibly rely on Miller's failure to obtain his FAA medical certification. *See id.* Finally, the District Court found that American adequately addressed Miller's diagnoses and job requirements as set forth in the WME report. *See id.* at *10.

Miller filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over an order granting summary judgment. *See Shook v. Avaya, Inc.*, 625 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2010). “In exercising this review, [w]e may affirm the order when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the facts reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” *Id.* (quoting *Kossler v. Crisanti*, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review a challenge by a participant to a termination of benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) under an arbitrary and capricious standard where, as here, the plan grants the administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits. *See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn*, 554 U.S. 105, 115-16 (2008); *Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch*, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). An administrator’s decision is arbitrary and capricious “if it is ‘without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.’” *Abnathya v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.*, 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993) (quotations and citations omitted).²

² In the ERISA context, the arbitrary and capricious and abuse of discretion standards of review are essentially identical. *See Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp.*, 625 F.3d 788, 793 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010).

We review various procedural factors underlying the administrator's decision-making process, as well as structural concerns regarding how the particular ERISA plan was funded, to determine if the conclusion was arbitrary and capricious.³ See, e.g., *Glenn*, 554 U.S. at 116-17; *Estate of*

³ In *Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch*, the Supreme Court determined that when an ERISA plan grants discretion to the administrator, whether the administrator operates under a conflict of interest is a factor that must be weighed in determining if there was an abuse of that discretion. 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). After *Firestone*, our Court employed a "sliding scale" standard of review where the level of conflict would influence the intensity of arbitrary and capricious review. See *Post v. Hartford Ins. Co.*, 501 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in *Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn*, however, instructed that "*Firestone* means what the word 'factor' implies, namely, that when judges review the lawfulness of benefit denials, they will often take account of several different considerations of which a conflict of interest is one." 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008).

As a result of *Glenn*, the "sliding scale" approach is no longer valid. See *Estate of Schwing v. The Lilly Health Plan*, 562 F.3d 522, 525 (3d Cir. 2009). Instead, we "apply a deferential abuse of discretion standard of review across the board and consider any conflict of interest as one of several factors in considering whether the administrator or the fiduciary abused its discretion." *Id.* Accordingly, even though our cases prior to *Glenn* are no longer good law to the

Schwing v. The Lilly Health Plan, 562 F.3d 522, 525-26 (3d Cir. 2009). Whereas “[t]he structural inquiry focuses on the financial incentives created by the way the plan is organized,” i.e., whether there is a conflict of interest, “the procedural inquiry focuses on how the administrator treated the particular claimant.” *Post v. Hartford Ins. Co.*, 501 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2007). Specifically, in considering the process that the administrator used in denying benefits, we have considered numerous “irregularities” to determine “whether, in this claimant’s case, the administrator has given the court reason to doubt its fiduciary neutrality.” *See id.* at 165 (internal citations omitted). Ultimately, we “determine lawfulness by taking account of several different, often case-specific, factors, reaching a result by weighing all together.” *Glenn*, 554 U.S. at 117.

III.

A. Termination of Benefits

Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA allows a participant to bring a claim to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).⁴ Miller asserts that

extent they applied the “sliding scale” approach, the various factors that our Court has historically evaluated must still be considered on arbitrary and capricious review. *See id.* at 526.

⁴ ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) provides:

“A civil action may be brought –

American's termination of his LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious because (1) the decision was not based on substantial evidence, (2) American operated under a structural conflict of interest whereby it had the incentive to deny his claim, and (3) American committed numerous procedural errors during its review of his case. We address each argument in turn.

1. Support for the Termination Decision

We determined in *Schwing* that where there was “an abundance of evidence of [the claimant’s] misconduct to support the denial of [the] claim,” a structural conflict of interest or procedural irregularities would not serve to “tip[] the scales in favor of finding that the [administrator] abused its discretion.” 562 F.3d at 526. American contends, at the outset, that there was “overwhelming evidence of the absence of a disability” that “plainly” supports the termination of Miller’s benefits, and that we should not consider whether any procedural irregularities tainted their decision-making. (American Br. at 19, 34.) In this regard, American relies heavily on Dr. Gonzalez’s description of Miller as being “asymptomatic” to argue that there was substantial support

(1) by a participant or beneficiary –

...

(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan[.]”

for their decision to terminate benefits and that any irregularities should be disregarded. American essentially argues that because Dr. Gonzalez labeled Miller as asymptomatic, he had actually been erroneously awarded benefits in the past and this had gone unnoticed. We disagree.

The record demonstrates, contrary to American's assertion that Miller simply slipped through the cracks, that American exercised frequent oversight in Miller's case. In fact, American reviewed and relied on documentation from Dr. Gonzalez stating that Miller was asymptomatic and, on multiple occasions over several years, found that this description supported the payment of benefits. Notably, in 2003, American determined that Miller "[m]edically qualifies for [the] disability pension program" and reinstated his LTD benefits after receiving records describing him as asymptomatic. (App. at 148.) Yet, after receiving additional reports containing this *same* description, American terminated Miller's benefits. As such, American interpreted Dr. Gonzalez's characterization of Miller as asymptomatic to mean that he was both eligible for disability benefits and that his benefits should be terminated. American's reliance on the term "asymptomatic" as the linchpin of Miller's ineligibility for disability benefits is, therefore, misplaced.

Further, the record reveals that although Dr. Gonzalez reported that Miller was no longer taking medication, he consistently stated that Miller was still under his care. Indeed, American noted twice after receiving records from

Dr. Gonzalez that Miller was unable to return to work as a pilot. (*Id.* at 105-06.) In addition, American's internal records repeatedly state that Miller was diagnosed with anxiety and brief reactive psychosis. (*Id.* at 104-06.) Notably, only a few days before American terminated Miller's benefits, American's records state that Miller's diagnosis was the "same." (*Id.* at 107.) Finally, Dr. Gonzalez's letter in support of Miller's appeal to the PBAC notes that his psychiatric conditions are permanent and that continued treatment is necessary to stabilize his health.

A review of the administrative record, therefore, demonstrates that although Miller may not have been outwardly manifesting symptoms, his psychiatric diagnoses remained constant and required regular treatment. As such, Dr. Gonzalez's report that Miller suffered from anxiety diagnosis and brief reactive psychosis constituted "an illness or injury verified through a qualified medical authority," thus satisfying the definition of disability under the Plan. (*Id.* at 717.) Unlike *Schwing*, the administrative record does not contain "an abundance of evidence" of ineligibility such that we should ignore any procedural defects in the termination decision. 562 F.3d at 526. Because we disagree with American's assertion that Dr. Gonzalez's description of Miller as being "asymptomatic" forecloses our inquiry into whether the termination of benefits was arbitrary and capricious, we consider each factor in turn.

2. Structural Conflict of Interest

In a situation where “a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a ‘facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.’” *Firestone*, 489 U.S. at 115 (internal citation omitted). In *Glenn*, the Supreme Court held that a conflict emerges “where it is the employer that both funds the plan and evaluates the claims” because “[i]n such a circumstance, ‘every dollar provided in benefits is a dollar spent by . . . the employer; and every dollar saved . . . is a dollar in [the employer’s] pocket.’” 554 U.S. at 112. (internal citation omitted).

Prior to *Glenn*, we consistently held that there is no conflict of interest when an employer operates an actuarially grounded plan whereby claims are paid through a trust. See, e.g., *Post*, 501 F.3d at 164 n.6; *Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.*, 268 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2001); *Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.*, 214 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2000); *Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 113 F.3d 433, 437 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997); *Abnathya*, 2 F.3d at 45 n.5. In that type of arrangement, the employer makes fixed contributions based on an actuarial formula that estimates the plan’s projected benefit obligation. See *Pinto*, 214 F.3d at 388. Therefore, we previously determined that no conflict existed because the employer did not incur a direct expense in allowing benefits, nor did it gain a direct benefit in denying claims. See *id.*

In light of *Glenn*, however, we conclude that this approach is no longer valid. *Glenn* instructs that a conflict arises where an employer both funds and evaluates claims. *See* 554 U.S. at 112. The Supreme Court's broad view of whether a conflict of interest exists, therefore, encompasses an arrangement where an employer makes fixed contributions to a plan, evaluates claims, and pays claims through a trust. Even in an actuarially grounded plan, the employer provides the monetary contribution and any money saved reduces the employer's projected benefit obligation. *See id.* The Supreme Court did recognize, however, that a conflict "should prove less important (perhaps to the vanishing point) where the administrator has taken active steps to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by walling off claims administrators from those interested in firm finances." *Id.* at 117.

Turning to the case at hand, the Plan is a defined benefit plan that American funds based on an actuarial formula. The record reveals that although American did meet ERISA's minimum funding requirements in 2006, the year Miller's benefits were terminated, the Plan still lacked funds to meet a significant amount of its projected benefit obligation. Despite the fact that American made fixed contributions to the Plan, every dollar that American saved by reducing disability payments decreased its projected benefit obligation. American argues that WME's involvement in the review process insulated American from any conflict of interest because the WME report was binding on all parties. We do not believe that the WME review totally eliminated

any conflict of interest. First, it is undisputed that American terminated Miller's benefits well before WME became involved at the appeal stage. Second, Charlotte Teklitz, the PBAC representative, testified in her deposition that American could seek further review of the WME report's conclusions if it was dissatisfied with its analysis. (App. at 549.) Though the WME review of Miller's claims may have ameliorated some of the effects of the conflict of interest, the fact remains that American did have some incentive to terminate Miller's benefits. And, even though this conflict is rather indirect, we must afford it some weight in light of *Glenn*. See 554 U.S. at 112. Therefore, American's structural conflict of interest weighs slightly in Miller's favor.

3. Procedural Factors

a. Reversal of Position

An administrator's reversal of its decision to award a claimant benefits without receiving any new medical information to support this change in position is an irregularity that counsels towards finding an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., *Post*, 501 F.3d at 164-65; *Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.*, 214 F.3d 377, 393 (3d Cir. 2000). Miller claims that American abruptly terminated his benefits in 2006 upon evaluating the same information that it had previously found to support an award of benefits. The District Court found that our decision in *Foley v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 98 Pension Fund*, 271 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 2001), dictates that

American should not be prevented from terminating Miller's benefits, despite the fact that it previously awarded them. *See Miller*, 2010 WL 890016, at *8. In any event, the District Court further concluded, American did not unjustifiably reverse its position as to Miller's eligibility because American received reports from Dr. Gonzalez that Miller was asymptomatic in 2005 and 2006 to support the conclusion that he was no longer disabled. *See id.*

Our review of the decision in *Foley* leads us to conclude that it is not controlling in this situation. In *Foley*, the claimant argued that it was arbitrary and capricious for the employer to refuse to apply an exception for calculating credited service when it had previously interpreted the pension plan to allow the exception for other employees. *See* 271 F.3d at 554. We rejected that argument, reasoning that it would be improper to effectively foreclose an employer from correcting a previous erroneous interpretation of a plan. *See id.* at 558-59. Thus, *Foley* deals with an employer's reversal of a previous interpretation of a plan's *language*. It does not address the significance of an employer's inconsistent treatment of medical evidence used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. In fact, we made clear in *Post*, decided after *Foley*, that an employer's reversal of position as to whether a claimant is disabled is a significant factor to be weighed on arbitrary and capricious review. *See Post*, 501 F.3d at 164-65.

Turning to the District Court's alternative conclusion that American did not reverse its position, we disagree that

the documentation from Dr. Gonzalez provided new information regarding Miller's eligibility for benefits. The records that American received from Dr. Gonzalez in 2005 and 2006 stating that Miller was asymptomatic do not differ in any material aspect from the records submitted in 2003 that American determined supported a disability finding. For example, Dr. Gonzalez reported in 2003 that Miller was diagnosed with anxiety and brief reactive psychosis, but that he was currently asymptomatic. Later, in 2005, Dr. Gonzalez stated that Miller was asymptomatic and was working toward preventing manifestations of stress. Similarly, in 2006, Dr. Gonzalez reported that Miller's diagnoses remained the same and that he was asymptomatic. Each report mirrors the next and identifies Miller as "asymptomatic." Thus, the more recent records were only "new" to the extent that they had not been received before; they did not provide any new information.

Moreover, American admitted that it could not determine whether there was any change that occurred in Miller's psychiatric condition between January 2003 and May 2007. As a result, the information that American relied upon to terminate Miller's benefits in 2006 was the same type of documentation that American interpreted to support a disability finding in 1999 and again in 2003 through 2006. We recognize that American's initial payment of Miller's benefits does not operate as an estoppel such that they can never terminate benefits. But, in the absence of any meaningful evidence to support a change in position, American's abrupt reversal is cause for concern that weighs

in favor of finding that its termination decision was arbitrary and capricious. *See id.*; *see also McOsker v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.*, 279 F.3d 586, 589 (8th Cir. 2002) (reversal of position supported arbitrary and capricious finding where information used to terminate benefits did “not vary significantly from the [previous] opinions”).

b. Reliance on Non-Existent Plan Requirements

We have previously held that an employer who imposes requirements extrinsic to the plan in evaluating eligibility for benefits acts arbitrarily and capriciously. *See, e.g., Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 113 F.3d 433, 443 (3d Cir. 1997); *Epright v. Env'tl. Res. Mgmt., Inc. Health and Welfare Plan*, 81 F.3d 335, 342-43 (3d Cir. 1996). Miller argues that American acted arbitrarily and capriciously by relying in part on his failure to obtain his FAA medical certification. The District Court found that the reference to the FAA certification was “troubling” and “regrettable” when the Plan did not impose this requirement. *Miller*, 2010 WL 890016, at *9. Nonetheless, the District Court concluded that the termination decision could have been based on American’s inability to verify Miller’s disability or Miller’s failure to obtain the recertification. *See id.* Because the letter concluded by noting that “verification of [Miller’s] continued disability cannot be established,” the District Court reasoned that the FAA medical certification language was “harmless error.” *Id.* The District Court did not consider whether American relied on Miller’s failure to obtain his FAA certification during the appeal stage.

Based on the plain language in the termination letter, as well as the other evidence in the record, we conclude that American did rely, to some extent, on Miller's failure to obtain his FAA medical certification. First, the letter states that American was "unable to verify either the existence of a continuing medical disability or [Miller's] continued substantial progress towards obtaining [his] medical certification." (App. at 98.) Therefore, there were apparently two potential bases for American's decision, one of which was Miller's failure to seek his FAA medical recertification. In addition, the letter instructs that Miller could receive "further favorable consideration" if he demonstrated that he was actively pursuing the certification. (*Id.*) It is unlikely that American would include this instruction if Miller's obtaining his FAA certification did not somehow bear on his eligibility for benefits.

Second, American offered no evidence to establish, contrary to the termination letter's focus, that it did not rely on this requirement. Dr. Bettes, the author of the termination letter, testified that he could not recall whether the decision to terminate Miller's benefits was influenced by Miller's failure to seek medical certification. (*Id.* at 1130.) In fact, Dr. Bettes also testified that a pilot's failure to apply for FAA certification could contribute to his decision to deny benefits. (*Id.*)

Moreover, Drs. Crain and Seskind placed significant weight on Miller's failure to obtain his medical certification in the WME report. Notably, Dr. Crain remarked that "[t]he

records of Dr. Gonzalez do not document any psychiatric problems or issues to explain his failure to obtain the medical certificate, so that it cannot be attributed to a mental disorder.” (*Id.* at 310.) Likewise, Dr. Seskind devoted a significant portion of his report to a discussion of Miller’s failure to regain his FAA medical certification. His analysis concluded by noting that because Miller had not been denied this certification, he was not suffering from a mental illness and therefore was not truly disabled. Because American adopted the WME report and included it in the final letter affirming the termination of Miller’s benefits, it relied on this requirement. Given that American did not offer any evidence to contradict the plain language of the letter, the overreaching emphasis on this requirement in the termination letter and throughout the appeal process demonstrates that it was a factor in the termination decision here. The Plan does not compel a pilot to seek FAA medical certification in order to be eligible for LTD benefits. Thus, American’s imposition of this requirement is a factor that counsels towards finding that the termination decision was arbitrary and capricious. *See Mitchell*, 113 F.3d at 443; *Epright*, 81 F.3d at 342-43.

c. Compliance with Section 503 of ERISA and Accompanying Regulations

Section 503 of ERISA requires that every employee benefit plan must:

“(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claims for

benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant, and

(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.”

29 U.S.C. § 1133. The accompanying regulations note that “this section sets forth minimum requirements for employee benefit plan procedures pertaining to claims for benefits by participants and beneficiaries.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(a). The regulations require a plan administrator to provide written notification of any adverse benefit determination setting forth

[I]n a manner calculated to be understood by the claimant . . . (i) [t]he specific reason or reasons for the adverse determination; (ii) [r]eference to the specific plan provisions on which the determination is based; (iii) [a] description of any additional material or information necessary for the claimant to perfect the claim and an explanation of why such material or information is necessary[.]”

Id. § 2560.503-1(g)(1). The District Court determined that § 503 and the accompanying regulations were irrelevant to Miller’s claim, as it was brought pursuant to § 502. *See Miller*, 2010 WL 890016, at *9. The District Court erred in this regard. Although § 502 provides the private right of action to bring a claim to recover benefits due, § 503 sets forth the basic requirements governing ERISA plans. To that end, a plan that does not satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of § 503 and its regulations operates in violation of ERISA. Therefore, an administrator’s compliance with § 503 in making an adverse benefit determination is probative of whether the decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious. *See, e.g., Majeski v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 590 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2009); *Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 574 F.3d 75, 87 (2d Cir. 2009); *Grossmuller v. Int’l Union*, 715 F.2d 853, 856-57 (3d Cir. 1983); *Kao v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.*, 647 F. Supp. 2d 397, 410 (D.N.J. 2009). Indeed, the Department of Labor has noted that “the procedural minimums of the regulation are essential to procedural fairness.” Department of Labor Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, 65 Fed. Reg. 70246, 70255 (proposed Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2560).

We briefly addressed whether a denial letter set forth adequate “specific reasons” under § 503 and the accompanying regulations in *Grossmuller*, 715 F.2d at 858. There, we determined that the administrator’s termination letter did not comply with § 503 where it informed the claimant that his benefits were terminated because he was found to be otherwise gainfully employed, without providing

any factual basis to support the decision or stating upon what evidence the administrator relied. *See id.* Conversely, in *Syed v. Hercules Inc.*, 214 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2000), we concluded that the letter satisfied § 503 where it explained that the claimant's benefits were terminated because the results of the particular doctor's independent medical evaluation demonstrated that he was no longer disabled. *See* 214 F.3d at 162-63. The administrator reached this conclusion after analyzing the present physical diagnosis in light of the definition of total disability under the plan. *See id.*

Other decisions addressing this discrete issue are also instructive. For example, the Seventh Circuit held in *Halpin v. W.W. Grainger, Inc.*, that the termination letter did not satisfy § 503 when it stated that "no objective medical evidence was contained in [the] claim to substantiate total disability from any gainful occupation." 962 F.2d 685, 692-93 (7th Cir. 1992). The court instructed that the bare conclusions in the letter, unsupported by any rationale, did not set forth "specific reasons" as mandated by § 503. *See id.* at 693. Similarly, in *Vanderklok v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance*, 956 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit found that the denial letter did not comply with § 503. There, the letter informed the claimant accordingly, "[w]e regret that the claim does not qualify . . . because the proof does not establish that the insured is totally and permanently disabled." 956 F.2d at 616. The court determined that the letter's purported "reasons" were simply unsupported

conclusions that did not provide any specific information as to the basis for the denial. *See id.*

By contrast, in *Hobson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.*, 574 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit reasoned that the denial letter complied with § 503 because it described the precise information that was lacking from the file, such as whether claimant's depression was severe enough to result in suicidal thoughts or hospitalization, whether the seizures were ongoing, and whether the claimant exhibited the diagnostic criteria for the relevant disease. Accordingly, the Second Circuit found that the administrator's letter presented the claimant with a specific rationale for the denial of benefits, not simply a conclusory statement that she was ineligible. *See id.* at 87.

We find the termination letter in this case to be legally deficient under § 503 for two reasons. First, the letter does not provide "specific reasons for [the] denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant." 29 U.S.C. § 1133. The letter states that American is "unable to verify either the existence of a continuing medical disability or [Miller's] continued substantial progress towards obtaining [his] FAA medical certification." (App. at 98.) American's inability to "verify" Miller's disability is a bare conclusion that does not provide a specific reason for the termination decision. Rather, this purported explanation is a general blanket assessment that Miller is ineligible for disability benefits. The letter makes no mention of Miller's specific diagnoses nor the precise information that is lacking from his

